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I. Developments in Personal Jurisdiction
DAVID LOMBARDERO**
A. ALTERNATIVE MODES OF SERVICE OF PROCESS: SERVICE BY E-MAIL
In Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink,' a Nevada hotel and casino operator (RIO) sued
a Costa Rican sports book operator (RII) in federal court in Las Vegas. RIO operated a
sports book at its well-known land-based casino, and maintained an internet site,
www.playrio.com. RII ran a sports book via a toll-free phone number and its website,
www.riosports.com, which it advertised in, among other places, Las Vegas. When RIO
learned of RII's operations and ads, it demanded that RII cease operating the riosports
website. Although RIO's demand evoked no formal response, RII established a new website,
www.betrio.com. RIO sued.
RIO had difficulty serving process on RII. Although RII used the address of its inter-
national courier, IEC, in Miami when it registered its domain names, IEC was not author-
ized to accept service of process on RII. Nonetheless, RIO mailed the summons and com-
plaint to IEC, which forwarded it to RH. This prompted a telephone call from a Los Angeles
attorney, requesting that RIO send him a more legible copy of the complaint. Although
RIO obliged, the attorney declined to accept service of process. RIO was unable to find a
physical address for RII. It was told that physical mail should be sent to IEC, but the
preferred method of communication was via e-mail.
Rather than attempting to serve RII in a manner authorized by FED. R. Civ. P. 4(0(2),
i.e., as authorized by Costa Rican law for service of process issuing from Costa Rican courts,
or in accordance with directions from the Costa Rican government pursuant to letters
rogatory, RIO elected to apply to the district court for an order pursuant to FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(0(3), "by other means ...as may be directed by the court."2 The district court
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1. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002).
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authorized RIO to effect service of process by physically mailing it to IEC and Carpenter,
coupled with sending it to RII electronically at its e-mail address, and RIO did so. RII
responded by moving, unsuccessfully, to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process and
lack of personal jurisdiction. After RII repeatedly failed to respond to discovery and comply
fully with the court's orders, the district court entered judgment by default against RII and
awarded RIO monetary sanctions. RII appealed.
In challenging service of process, RI argued that RIO had to attempt to effect service
pursuant to Rule 4(0(2) before making application under Rule 4(0(3).1 The Ninth Circuit
disagreed, holding that "court-directed service under Rule 4(0(3) is as favored as service
available under" any other subsection of Rule 4(0. 4 It also held that the method of service
authorized by the district court was reasonable under the circumstances; it was calculated
to give RI actual notice of the lawsuit, and in fact did so.'
This opinion should not be read as giving district courts carte blanche to approve service
of process by e-mail, especially not as a stand-alone method of service. The court stated
that the district court must "balance the limitations of email service against its benefits in
any particular case." 6 In this case, it was obvious that RI in fact had received the process
through IEC and had even forwarded it to its attorney.
B. No JURISDICTION OVER INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER
In ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc.,7 plaintiff brought suit in federal court
in Maryland for copyright infringement. Among others ALS, sued Digital, which was the
Internet Service Provider (ISP) for the defendants who maintained and posted allegedly
infringing photographs on their website. Digital, however, was based in Georgia and did
not solicit business in Maryland, where ALS brought suit. The court held that the passive
act of providing internet access that allowed patrons to create and maintain websites to
display material that would be accessed and viewed in other states and possibly cause injury
there was insufficient to subject the ISP to personal jurisdiction in those other states.8
Although there is nothing unusual about this analysis, the result is important. Absent such
a rule, any ISP would be exposing itself to suit virtually anywhere in the world.
C. IN REM AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE ANTICYBERSQUATrING CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT
In 2002, the Fourth Circuit decided, in tandem, two noteworthy cases regarding the
constitutionality and scope of jurisdiction under the in rem jurisdictional provision of the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). The specific provision for in rem
jurisdiction is 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A), which provides for in rem jurisdiction over the
domain name if the owner of a registered mark or a mark protected by § 1125(a) (infringe-
3. See Rio Props., Inc., 284 F.3d at 1014-15. Costa Rica is not a party to the Hague Convention or other
agreement with the United States regarding service of process, so that FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1) was not applicable.
Id. at 1015 & n.4.
4. See id. at 1015.
5. See id. at 1017-19.
6. See id. at 1018.
7. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002).
8. See id. at 715-16.
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ment) or § 1125(c) (dilution) "is not able to obtain inpersonam jurisdiction over" the owner
or registrar of the markY The remedies are limited to "forfeiture or cancellation of the
domain name" or its transfer to the owner of the protected mark.'0 The domain name is
deemed to be situated, inter alia, where the registry is located." Network Solutions, Inc.
(NSI), now a subsidiary of VeriSign, Inc., was and remains the sole registry worldwide of
internet domain names ending in .com, .net, and .org, and is located in Virginia.
Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names2 involved a dispute between the famous
London department store and its erstwhile Argentine affiliate over the rights to use various
internet domain names containing the name "Harrods." Harrods brought suit in rem against
the domain names under the ACPA, asserting a variety of trademark claims. In Porsche Cars
N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net,'3 Porsche brought suit against several defendants, foreign and
domestic, alleging trademark dilution arising out of their use of domain names containing
"Porsche" or "Porscha." In addition to forfeiture of the domain names, Porsche sought
injunctive and other relief.
The Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of in rem jurisdiction under the ACPA.
Together, the cases raised and answered four principal questions. First, are domain names
a form of "property" over which in rem jurisdiction could be exercised? In Porsche, the court
relied on district-court precedent to hold that Congress has the power under the Consti-
tution to treat an internet domain name as property and clearly did so in the ACPA.
14
Second, is registration in the forum state a "minimum contact" sufficient to permit the
exercise of jurisdiction over a domain in the forum state? In both cases, the court held that
because the very subject-matter of the lawsuits was ownership of the names in question, or
a claim that the owner of the names had violated his rights and duties regarding the use
the names, the suits constitutionally could be maintained in rem in Virginia, where the
owners registered the names." Further, because NSI, the registry, was based in Virginia,
that state had a sufficient interest in ensuring marketability of domain names and resolving
disputes over them to support the exercise of jurisdiction."
Third, are "bad faith" registration and use claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1) the only
claims that can be brought in rem under the ACPA? The Harrods court disagreed with the
majority of district courts regarding the scope of the in rem jurisdictional provision of
the ACPA. In a lengthy discourse on the legislative history and statutory interpretation, the
court held that the in rem provision was not limited to trademark claims under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(1) ("bad faith" registration, trafficking in, or use of a domain name). 7
Fourth, does the predicate for the invocation of jurisdiction in rem have to be satisfied
throughout the proceedings, or only initially? In Porsche, the Fourth Circuit held that the
jurisdictional predicate for the invocation of in rem jurisdiction need only be met at the
time the court makes the finding that the plaintiff could not obtain in personam jurisdiction
9. 15 U.S.C. § 11 25(d)(2)(D) (2003).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D).
II. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(C).
12. Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002).
13. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2002).
14. See id. at 260.
15. See id. at 259-60; Harrods, 302 F.3d at 224-25.
16. See Harrods, 302 F.3d at 224-25.
17. See id. at 227-32.
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in the United States. The court held that, although a defendant may be able to defeat in
rem jurisdiction by having a suitable representative consent to personal jurisdiction in a
federal court, such an effort must be timely. Here, any objection was waived because the
defendant did not consent to jurisdiction-in a court across the continent-until three days
before the scheduled trial date.'
D. FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT DOES NOT CONFER PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In two unrelated decisions, the Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit each held that
Chapter II of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, merely gives federal courts
subject-matter jurisdiction over actions to enforce foreign arbitral awards, but that an in-
dependent ground, satisfying the standard constitutional due-process analysis, is required
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.' 9 While these appear to be the
first pronouncements on this specific issue to come from appellate courts, they are, as the
Ninth Circuit stated, "unexceptional." '20 More interestingly, the two courts diverged in
dictum regarding enforceability of the arbitral award against property in the forum state-
i.e., quasi in rem. The Fourth Circuit would apply a standard "minimum contacts" analysis,
with the presence of the property serving merely as a contact of minor significance,z" but
the Ninth Circuit might uphold quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, in treating the foreign arbitral
award much as if it already were a judgment that was being enforced.22
E. DEFAULT JUDGMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE LITIGATION OF JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
INTERTWINED WITH THE MERITS
In Jackson v. FIE Corp.,2' the plaintiff accidentally dropped a loaded semi-automatic pistol,
which discharged, rendering him a quadriplegic. He filed a product-liability suit in Loui-
siana, suing several defendants, including three Italian corporations, all containing the fam-
ily name "Tanfoglio" that allegedly manufactured the pistol and/or its parts. All of the
Tanfoglio firms defaulted and, after a hearing on liability and damages, the district court
entered a judgment for over $11 million against them.2 4 Nearly two years later, Defendant
Fratelli Tanfoglio filed a motion in the district court to set aside the judgment under
Rule 60(b)(4) as void ab initio for lack of personal jurisdiction."
Fratelli Tanfoglio argued that it did not manufacture the type of pistol involved until a
year after the accident, and that it did not have continuous and systematic contacts with
Louisiana. As a consequence, Fratelli Tanfoglio argued, it lacked minimum contacts that
would enable the court to exercise either general jurisdiction over it, or specific jurisdiction
with respect to Jackson's claims. Fratelli Tanfoglio thus directly attacked the conclusory
testimony of Jackson's firearms expert that the pistol was "made by Giuseppe Tanfoglio and
18. See Porsche, 302 F.3d at 258-59.
19. Glencore Grain Rotterdam, B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002);
Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC, 283 F.3d 208, 212 (4th Cir. 2002).
20. Glencore Grain Rotterdam, B.V., 284 F.3d at 1121.
21. See Base Metal Trading, Ltd., 283 F.3d at 213-14.
22. See Glencore Grain Rotterdam, B.V., 284 F.3d at 1127.
23. Jackson v. FIE Corp., 302 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2002).
24. Id. at 519-20.
25. Id. at 520.
VOL. 37, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 483
Fratelli Tanfoglio."6 The district court denied the motion, reasoning that Fratelli Tanfog-
lio's default "conclusively established" that it had manufactured the pistol in question, and
that its discovery responses established that it had the "minimum contacts" with Louisiana
necessary to support the exercise of jurisdiction." Fratelli Tanfoglio then appealed.
The Fifth Circuit first held that Fratelli Tanfoglio's nearly two-year delay in seeking to
vacate the judgment was not a ground for denying relief because "at least absent extraor-
dinary circumstances ... the mere passage of time cannot convert an absolutely void judg-
ment into a valid one.""8 Most importantly, the court held that in seeking to vacate the
judgment, Fratelli Tanfoglio remained free to establish that it had not manufactured the
pistol in question, even though this fact was essential to the merits.2 9
In coming to this holding, the Fifth Circuit looked to Supreme Court precedent from
the nineteenth century allowing a collateral attack on a foreign-state judgment for lack of
personal jurisdiction based upon facts that were also essential to the merits.30 The court
also concluded that "the protections of personal jurisdiction must trump the doctrine of
claim preclusion," because underlying jurisdictional challenges are of constitutional dimen-
sion and appear in formal rules, whereas the doctrine of resjudicata is merely judicially
created." The court noted the possibility of an anomalous result if Fratelli Tanfoglio were
found on remand to be subject to general but not specific jurisdiction: The default judgment
then would become binding and conclusively determine that Fratelli Tanfoglio was liable
for having manufactured the pistol, even though it in fact had not done so." That, appar-
ently, is one of the prices of defaulting.
II. Recent Developments in the Service of Process Abroad
N. JANSEN CALAMITA*
A. INTRODUCTION
In the federal courts, the service of process outside the United States in civil actions is
governed by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." In state courts, the particular
procedures of the forum state must be determined. In either case, however, where service
is to be made in a foreign state that is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (Hague Convention), the Supreme Court
has directed that the Hague Convention provides the exclusive means for effecting service
on the territory of a signatory state.'4 Where service on a foreign party may be effected in
26. Id. at 519.
27. Id. at 520-21.
28. Id. at 523.
29. See id. at 531.
30. Id. at 527 (citing Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 427 (1873)).
31. See id. at 529-30.
32. Id.
*N. Jansen Calamita is an attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser, United States Department of
State. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of State or the
United States Government.
33. In addition, service of process on foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities must generally
be effected in accordance with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (2003).
34. Volkswagenwerk AG v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
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the United States without the need for service abroad, the Supreme Court has held that
the Hague Convention is not applicable. 5
B. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION
1. Service by Mail under Hague Convention Article 10(a)
One issue that continues to cause disagreement among federal and state courts is whether
article 10(a) of the Hague Convention, preserving "the freedom to send judicial documents,
by postal channels, directly to persons abroad,"' 6 authorizes the service of judicial documents
by mail, or whether it merely authorizes the mailing of documents other than process.,7
In Nuovo Pignone, SpA v. Storman Asia M/V,5 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted
the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit's leading decision in Bankston,3" and lined up on the
side of the courts that have held that article 10(a) does not permit service of process by
mail.4° In rejecting a broad reading of the term "send," the court observed that "because
the drafters purposely elected to use forms of the word 'service' throughout the Hague
Convention, while confining the use of the word 'send' to article 10(a), we will not presume
that the drafters intended to give the same meaning to 'send' that they intended to give to
'service." 4' A similarly narrow reading of "send" was adopted by a federal bankruptcy court
in Florida.42
As 2003 began, however, a bankruptcy court in Delaware, citing the absence of control-
ling precedent in the Third Circuit sided with the proponents of a liberal construction of
article 10(a) and permitted service of process by mail on defendants located in the United
Kingdom. Persuaded by the Second Circuit's decision in Ackerman,4' the court determined
that for the purposes of article 10(a), "send" means "service of process" and "the drafters
only varied the language used."-
35. Id.
36. Emphasis added. Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention provides in pertinent part: "Provided the State
of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with (a) the freedom to send judicial
documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad .. " Hague Conference PIL Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, art.
10 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
37. In either case, article 10(a) may only be used if the receiving state has not registered its opposition
pursuant to article 21.
38. Nuovo Pignone, SpA v. Storman Asia M/V, 310 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2002).
39. Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989).
40. In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit implicitly overruled a number of 2002 district court decisions in the Fifth
Circuit in which service of process by mail under article 10(a) was expressly approved. See, e.g., Brown v. Bandai
Am., Inc., No. 3-01 -CV-0442-R, 2002 WL 1285265, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 4, 2002); International Transac-
tions, Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Regionmontana S.A. de C.V., No. Civ. A. 3:01CVI 140G, 2002 WL 413895,
at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2002).
41. Nuovo Pignon, 310 F.3d at 384.
42. In re Greater Ministries Int'l., Inc., 282 B.R. 496 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (noting the absence of con-
trolling precedent in the Eleventh Circuit and "refus[ingI to incorporate service into the meaning of the word
'send' in Article 10(a)").
43. Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cit. 1986).
44. In re Harnischfeger Indus., Inc., No. 99-02171 PJW, 2003 WL 23390, at *4 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 2,
2003). See also Eto v. Muranaka, 99 Hawaii 488, n.6; 57 P.3d 413, n.6 (2002) (stating in dicta that "service by
international registered mail is one of the other methods for service under the Hague Convention," but refusing
formally to resolve the issue in the case at bar).
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Absent controlling guidance from the courts of appeals or the Supreme Court, given this
uncertainty, practitioners remain well advised to exercise caution and avoid reliance on
service by mail under the Hague Convention.
4
1
C. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER RULE 4 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Nearly ten years after Congress completely overhauled Rule 4 with the 1993 amend-
ments, the provisions of the rule continue to raise some thorny issues.
1. Service of Process on Corporations Abroad Pursuant to the Laws of the Foreign Country
In both Convention and non-Convention cases over the past year, courts struggled with
the interpretive difficulties that can arise under Rule 4 when service of process is made on
a corporation abroad pursuant to the rules prescribed by the laws of the foreign country.
Under Rule 4(h)(2), service of process on a corporation outside of the United States may
be made "in any manner prescribed for individuals" pursuant to Rule 4(0, except by means
of "personal delivery" under Rule 4(f(2)(C)(i).' Rule 4(f)(2)(A), however, provides that
service of process abroad may be made "in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign
country for service in that country."
47
In 2002, one federal court had occasion to address the issue of conflicting rules when
"the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country" includes service by personal
delivery upon the corporation. 4 In Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., the court found that if personal
service on a corporation is permitted under the laws of the foreign country in which service
is to be effected, then, regardless of Rule 4(h)(2)'s limitations, the service is appropriate
under Rule 4(f)(2)(A). 49 As the court reasoned: "The proscription against personal service
on a foreign corporation in FRCvP 4(h)(2) is expressly limited to service under FRCvP
4(f)(2)(C)-not service under FRCvP 4(f(2)(A)."50 Accordingly, where service is undertaken
"in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that country,"
the relevant provision for analysis is Rule 4(f)(2)(A), regardless of the specific means of
service prescribed by the foreign country's law.'
A similar issue arose under Rule 4(h)(2) in the context of article 10(b) of the Hague
Convention. Under Article 10(b), in the absence of objection by the receiving state, the
"freedom" of judicial officers, officials, or other competent persons of the originating state
"to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials, or
45. For a more extensive, recent survey of the issues raised under article 10(a), see generally Alexandra
Arniel, Note, Recent Developments in the Interpretation ofArticle 10(a) of the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, 24 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 387 (2001); see also Katherine Birming-
ham Wilmore & Julian Ku, International Legal Developments in Review: 2001, Business Transactions & Disputes,
International Litigation, Service of Process Abroad, 36 INT'L LAW. 447 (2002).
46. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(2).
47. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(A).
48. Id.
49. Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., No. 02-CV-0133E(F), 2002 WVL 1628933, at *1 n.5 (W.D.N.Y. May 31,
2002).
50. Id.
51. As the court noted, the Advisory Committee notes on the 1993 amendment make the point that under
Rule 4(f), "[s]ubparagraphs (A) and (B) prescribe the more appropriate methods for conforming to local practice
or using local authority. Subparagraph (C) prescribes other methods authorized by the former rule." Ryan,
2002 WVL 1628933, at *1 n.5.
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other competent persons" of the receiving state is preserved. 5" In the United States, most
courts that have considered article 1 0(b) have concluded that it provides an additional means
for service under the Hague Convention by sanctioning service in accordance with the
means prescribed by the law of the state in which service is effected."'
In a number of cases, however, the issue has arisen whether the proscription against
personal service on a foreign corporation in Rule 4(h)(2) limits the availability of such
service under article 10(b), if personal service is otherwise permitted by the laws of the
receiving state. In Dimensional Communications, Inc. v. OZ Optics Ltd., the district court found
that where, pursuant to article 10(b), service had been personally served upon an officer of
the defendant Canadian corporation at the corporation's offices in Ontario in accordance
with Ontario law, nothing in Rule 4(h)(2) would render such service defectiveA. 4 In so doing,
the court distinguished an earlier decision by another district court in which service on a
corporate officer at his home address in England was rejected as improper on the grounds
that under Rule 4(h)(2) service on a corporate defendant abroad may not be made by per-
sonal delivery." According to the court in OZ Optics, the critical prohibition embodied by
the exception of the Rule 4(O(2)(C)(i) personal service option from Rule 4(h)(2) is not
personal service as such, but rather personal service on behalf of the corporation upon an
individual at his home instead of his business address.56
OZ Optics seems to leave open the possibility that service of process on a corporate officer
at a non-business address, which is appropriate under foreign law and article 10(b) of the
Hague Convention, is nevertheless defective for not complying with Rule 4(h)(2) and its
exception of Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(i). Surely such a result could not be right, particularly given
the admonition in the 1993 Advisory Committee notes to Rule 4 that "the revised rule
authorizes the use of any means of service provided by the law not only of the forum state,
but also of the state in which a defendant is served ..... ,1 Accordingly, in a case in which
it was found under article 10(b) that the law of the foreign state allowed personal service
on corporations, nothing in Rule 4(h)(2) and its exception of Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(i) could render
that service defective. Instead the operative provision of Rule 4(f being incorporated into
Rule 4(h)(2) would be Rule 4(f)(l), which requires the use of the Hague Convention's
provisions in cases where the Hague Convention applies.5s As the court similarly found in
the non-Convention context in Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., in such a case nothing in
Rule 4(0(2)(C)(i) would even be relevant to the court's determination.
52. Like Article 10(a), Article 10(b) may only be used if the receiving state has not registered its opposition
pursuant to Article 21.
53. See Gary Born, International Civil Litigation in U.S. Courts 821 (3d ed. 1996) (citing cases).
54. See id. at 656-57.
55. See id. (addressing Trump Taj Mahal Assoc. v. Hotel Services, Inc., 183 F.R.D. 173 (D.NJ. 1998)). The
court in Trump did not address whether the service as effected comported with the laws of England where the
corporate officer was served.
56. Id. at 657. See also Marcantonio v. Primorsk Shipping Corp., 206 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding
that service had not been properly effected under either the Hague Convention or Rule 4(h)(2), where plaintiff
served the defendant shipping company by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with the captain of
one of the defendant's ships in Canada).
57. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, 1993 Advisory Committee notes.
58. See Volkswagenwerk AG, 486 U.S. at 699. Note also the statement in the 1993 Advisory Committee notes
that the provisions of Rule 4(f)(2) and its subsections, e.g., Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(i), are meant to be "alternative
methods for use when internationally agreed methods are not intended to be exclusive. Clearly these
provisions are not applicable in a case in which the Hague Convention exclusively applies.
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2. The Availability of Court Directed Service under Rule 40(3)
Under Rule 4(0(3), a district court is authorized to direct that service of process be made
outside of the United States by any means not prohibited by international agreement. Two
non-Hague Convention cases decided over the past year came to different conclusions about
whether parties seeking court-directed service must first show that other methods of service
identified in Rule 4(o have been attempted or are otherwise unavailable. In Rio Properties,
Inc. v. Rio International Interlink, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the idea that
"Rule 4(0 should be read to create a hierarchy of preferred methods of service of process." 9
Referring to the Rule's text, its structure, and the Advisory Committee notes, the court
came to "the inevitable conclusion that service of process under Rule 4(0(3) is neither a
'last resort' nor 'extraordinary relief.' It is merely one means among several which enables
service of process on an international defendant."' 6
In Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., the district court, while acknowledging the Ninth Circuit's
analysis in Rio, nevertheless concluded that "in order to prevent parties from whimsically
seeking alternate methods of service and thereby increasing the workload of the courts," a
federal district court may, "in exercising the discretionary power permitted by FRCvP
4(0(3), impose a threshold requirement for parties to meet before seeking the court's as-
sistance. '61 Under the standard set by the court, while a party need not exhaust all possible
methods of service prior to seeking an order from the court, it is necessary "to show that
they have reasonably attempted to effectuate service on the defendant(s) and that the cir-
cumstances are such that the district court's intervention is necessary to obviate the need
to undertake methods of service that are unduly burdensome or that are untried but likely
futile. "62
D. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. STATE LAW AND THE
HAGUE CONVENTION
Courts continue to wrestle with the meaning of the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Volkswagenwerk AG v. Scblunk, that "[i]f the internal law of the forum state defines the
applicable method of serving process as requiring the transmittal of documents abroad,
then the Hague Convention applies."' 6 As the decisions over the past year show, there has
been more than a measure of truth to Justice Brennan's concern in Scblunk that a rule which
leaves the determination of the Hague Convention's application to "the internal law of the
forum state" runs the risk in the United States of creating fifty different standards for fifty
different states.- 4
In Eto v. Muranaka, for example, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that because service
of process on a foreign defendant was permitted via publication under Hawaii law, no
59. Rio Props., Inc, 284 F.3d at 1014 (allowing service of process by email).
60. Id. at 1015 (citation omitted). Because Rio was not a Hague Convention case, there was no occasion for
the court to consider whether the same would be true if the Convention applied. However, the Advisory
Committee notes clearly express that in cases in which the Hague Convention applies, "resort may be had" to
court-directed service under Rule 4(f)(3) only in limited circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, 1993 Advisory
Committee Notes.
61. Ryan, No. 02-CV-0133E(F), 2002 WL 1628933, at *2 (,V.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002) (allowing service of
process on corporation in Taiwan "by regular mail, fax and/or e-mail").
62. Id.
63. VolkswagenwerkAG, 486 U.S at 700.
64. Id. at 708 (BrennanJ., concurring).
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transmittal of documents abroad was implicated and therefore the Hague Convention did
not apply.6s In that case, the court reasoned that since the plaintiff had been unable to locate
the defendant abroad in Japan, the plaintiff was entitled to rely upon a Hawaii rule per-
mitting service of process in Hawaii by publication. According to the court, because the
plaintiff had shown that the defendant could not be found in Japan despite a variety of
efforts, process by publication was appropriate and did not raise any prospect of conflict
with the Hague Convention because the Hague Convention does not apply where the
address of the person to be served is not known.66
In Lafarge v. Altecb Environmental USA, however, a federal district court indicated that
there may be considerable scrutiny in cases where state court rules requiring actual service
of process are bypassed in favor of "last resort" rules that permit service to be effected in
the forum without the transmission of documents abroad.67 There, prior to the case being
removed to federal court, the plaintiff had obtained a state court order that permitted it to
serve the defendant foreign corporation in Michigan through its U.S. subsidiary. Under
the applicable state court rule, such an order was appropriate only "[o]n a showing that
service of process cannot reasonably be made" on the defendant abroad.6 Reviewing the
matter on the foreign defendant's Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss, the federal court con-
cluded that regardless of the state court's order permitting service on the U.S. subsidiary,
"no explanation" sufficient to the federal court had been provided to justify the plaintiff's
failure to effect service abroad in the first place.69 As a result, and on that basis, the federal
court rejected the service as an impermissible attempt to circumvent the Hague Convention.
While federal review of a state court order, as in Lafarge, is relatively rare, practitioners
should remain aware that even if service on a foreign defendant by means of publication
(or other domestic method) is upheld by a U.S. court, difficulties may be encountered in
enforcing any subsequent judgment in the defendant's home jurisdiction. 70
E. ADDITIONAL SIGNATORIES TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
1. Hague Convention
Two countries became signatories to the Hague Convention in 2002: San Marino on
April 15, 2002 and Kuwait on May 8, 2002.
2. Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory
There were no new signatories to the Inter-American Convention or its Additional Pro-
tocol in 2002.
65. Eto, 57 P.3d at 413.
66. Id. at 498, 423 (citing article 1). Hague Convention art. I reads in pertinent part: "This Convention
shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known." Hague Con-
vention, supra note 36, art. I.
67. Lefarge Corp. v. Altech Envt'l USA, 220 F. Supp. 2d 823 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
68. Id. at 83 1-32 (quoting the state court rule and finding that it "effectively requires the service of docu-
ments abroad").
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Eto, 57 P.3d at 424, n.8.
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M. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
HEATHER FAN AND GLENN W RHODES*
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (RE-
FAA Convention) governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards
in U.S. courts.7 The principles of comity as set forth in Hilton v. Guyot govern recognition
and enforcement of foreign court judgments in U.S. courts.72 The principles set forth in
Hilton are codified in the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which has
been adopted by many states. A Special Commission of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law is preparing a draft REFAA Convention on international jurisdiction and
the effects of foreign judgments." At a meeting of a Commission on General Affairs and
Policy of the Diplomatic Sessions in April 2002, it was decided to move to an informal
process to explore new ways of negotiating.74 To that end, the Informal Working Group
on the Judgments Project met in October 2002 to assist in the preparation of the REFAA
Convention."
A. THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
1. Procedural grounds for non-recognition offoreign arbitral awards
In In the Matter of the Arbitration between: Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. (Monde Re)
v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, a citizen of Monaco sought to enforce an arbitral award rendered
in Moscow against Ukrainian parties in a breach of contract dispute.7  The Second Circuit
declined on the procedural ground of forum non conveniens. The court held that forum non
conveniens could be applied to domestic cases brought under the REFAA Convention and
proceeded to evaluate the relevant factors. First, the court gave little deference to the foreign
plaintiff's choice of forum.77 Second, the court exhibited a reluctance to find foreign courts
"corrupt" or "biased" and determined that the Ukrainian judicial system provided an ad-
equate alternative forum. s Third, the court found the extensive discovery and factual in-
vestigation required to bind the Ukrainian non-signer of the arbitration agreement involved
foreign language documents, witnesses beyond the subpoena power of the United States,
*Heather Fan and Glenn W. Rhodes are attorneys with the firm of Howrey Simon Arnold & White, LLP.
71. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, TIAS 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention was implemented by 9 U.S.C.
§§ 201-208 (Federal Arbitration Act).
72. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
73. The status of the work being performed by the Special Commission of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law can be found at www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html. The Preliminary Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 1999, available at http:II
www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html.
74. Reflection Paper to Assist in the Preparation of a Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Aug. 2002, available at http://hcch.net/doc/
jdgm-pd I9e.doc.
75. The Report on the first meeting of the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project-October 22-25, 2002,
Nov. 2002, available at http://hcch.net/doc/jdgm-pd20e.doc.
76. See Monegasgue De Reassurances S.A.M. (Monde Re) v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488, 491 (2d
Cir. 2002).
77. See id. at 498-99.
78. Id. at 499.
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and an award more easily satisfied in the Ukraine7 9 Finally, the court found U.S. interest
in the case to be marginal, as only through its role as a signatory to the REFAA Conven-
tion.80 In view of the balance of these factors, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the proceedings."'
2. Substantive grounds for non-recognition offoreign arbitral awards
In Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., an Egyptian corporation petitioned the court to confirm
an arbitral award rendered in Egypt against a Cyprian corporation and its U.S. parent. 2
Although the U.S. parent corporation did not agree to arbitrate the dispute, it was held
liable under principles of contract and agency. 3 The court examined the defendant's ar-
guments for vacatur5 4 First, the court found no "extraordinary circumstances" including
deference to the findings of the arbitrator.8 1 In particular, the court rejected the argument
that U.S. substantive law should apply to assess arbitrability.s6 Next, the court balanced the
interests of international comity with the goals of arbitration in favor of enforcing the award
despite parallel proceedings in the Egyptian Supreme Court. 7 Finally, the court favored a
narrow reading of the public policy exception and held that because the defendant had
ample notice and was represented by counsel at the arbitration, there was no violation of
due process of law.8
3. Execution offoreign arbitral awards against disputed funds
Issues relating to the execution of awards may arise when parties seek to enforce foreign
arbitral awards against funds affecting non-parties, as in Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Peru-
sahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara.8 9 The underlying dispute involved an
Indonesian oil and gas company (Pertamina) that was owned and operated by the Republic
of Indonesia. The plaintiff, a Cayman Islands company, obtained an arbitration award
against Pertamina in Switzerland, after Pertamina suspended its energy extraction projects
79. See id. at 500.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 501.
82. See Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19229 *21 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
83. Id.
84. The Convention sets forth the following grounds for refusing to recognize a foreign arbitral award:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were under some incapacity, or the said agreement is
not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law
of the country where the award was made; or (b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present his case; or (c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms
of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration; or (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, or (e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set
aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award
was made. Convention, supra note 71, art. V(I). Enforcement may also be refused if the subject matter being
arbitrated is not capable of being settled by arbitration under the law of that country, or the recognition of the
award would be contrary to public policy of that country. Id. art. V(2).
85. See Sarhank Group at *13.
86. See id. at 14-15.
87. See id. at 17.
88. See id. at *20.
89. See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 313 F.3d
70 (2d Cir. 2002).
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in the midst of the Indonesia's fiscal and political instability.' ° The Swiss arbitration award
was later registered in a U.S. federal court."' This case arose on an interlocutory appeal
after the plaintiff sought to execute against fifteen U.S. bank accounts held by Pertamina
for distribution to the Republic of Indonesia. 9 The defendants contested attachment, claim-
ing that the funds in the U.S. accounts belonged to the Republic of Indonesia rather than
Pertamina, the party against whom the judgment was sought.13
Pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, the court first looked to New York's
choice of law provisions to determine which assets were subject to attachment against for-
eign states.9 4 The court then held that New York law looked to property interests and
mandated application of Indonesian property law to determine the ownership rights in the
bank accounts.9" Applying Indonesian property law, the court found that all of the funds,
except for a portion, belonged to the Republic of Indonesia.96 Despite plaintiff's arguments
that Pertamina held initial title and controlled the allocation of funds, the court held that
Pertamina lacked the requisite control over most of the disputed bank accounts.9 7 Further,
the court found that the sophistication of the parties cut against finding reasonable reliance
on the notion that Pertamina owned all of the funds.9" The court also acknowledged comity
concerns involving Indonesia's interpretation of laws, which the court afforded "some de-
gree of deference."9" Based on these findings, the court affirmed the district court's decision
to deny attachment of the main portion of the U.S. funds.08
B. THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS
In Society of Lloyd's v. Turner, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court's summary judg-
ment recognizing English monetary judgments against two American members of English
insurance syndicates.' °" The Society of Lloyd's (Lloyds) brought suit in England against
the American underwriters (Names) who refused to pay reinsurance premiums. 0 2 After a
series of lengthy litigations, the English court entered a money judgment against under-
writer Turner for breach of contract, as well as a default money judgment against under-
writer Webb who did not answer or defend in the English litigation.°3 The U.S. case arose
when Lloyd's sought recognition of both English monetary judgments in U.S. district court
under the Texas Foreign Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act.'
04
The court examined the provisions for non-recognition under the Uniform Foreign
90. See id. at 77-78.
91. See Karaha Bodas Co. L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minvak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3976, *7-8 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
92. See Karaba Bodas, 313 F.3d at 78-79.
93. See id. at 84.
94. See id. at 83.
95. See id. at 88.
96. See id. at 92.
97. See id. at 83, 86.
98. See id. at 90.
99. Id. at 92.
100. See id. at 93.
101. See Society of Lloyd's v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002).
102. See id. at 327-29.
103. See id. at 328-29.
104. See id. at 329.
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Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act. 05 First, the court determined that England
provided a sufficiently "fair and neutral" forum with "impartial tribunals or procedures
compatible with the requirements of due process of law," as required by statute.0 The
court stated that a foreign proceeding need not comply with the traditional due process
requirements of U.S. law to be recognized by the court. Further, the court rejected appel-
lant's argument that the different legal standards for breach of contract claims in England
offended public policy, holding that the relevant inquiry was whether the cause of action,
rather than the standards for evaluating the cause of action, offended the public policy of
the forum."° Based on these considerations, the court denied the defendant's motion for
non-recognition. 0s
In contrast, in Jaffe v. Accredited Surety and Casualty Co., Inc. the Fourth Circuit was
reluctant on public policy grounds to recognize a foreign money judgment when it would
result in a party's profiting from his own wrongdoing.' 9 The case involved husband and
wife plaintiffs, whose claims arose after the husband failed to appear for his trial on a series
of fraudulent real estate transactions. After serving sentences on his convictions, the couple
fled to Canada and became Canadian citizens. They then obtained Canadian default judg-
ments against the U.S. bond company who, according to the Canadian court, had illegally
abducted the bond jumper husband to the United States for trial. Relying on the Foreign
Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act, as codified in Virginia law, the husband and
wife then sought to enforce their separate default judgments against the bond company in
the United States.
The main issue in the case was whether enforcement of the judgment would be repugnant
to Virginia's public policy." 0 The court acknowledged a possible conflict in allowing re-
covery when the husband would be profiting from his wrongful act of jumping bond. The
court also questioned recovery because the husband was a fugitive in criminal fraud charges
pending in the United States."' Given these uncertainties, the court certified the issue to
the Supreme Court of Virginia. ' 2
IV. Discovery in International Litigation
CATHERINE PIcHf*
A. INTRODUCTION
In United States federal courts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781-84 and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure govern international discovery practices. In addition, where the other country
105. A foreign judgment should be recognized in a U.S. court if the foreign forum (1) allowed for a court
of competent jurisdiction to give a full and fair trial on the issues presented, (2) ensured that justice was
impartially administered, (3) ensured that the trial was free of fraud or prejudice, (4) had proper jurisdiction
over the parties, and (4) the judgment of the foreign forum did not violate public policy.
106. Society of Lloyd's, 303 F.3d at 331.
107. See id. at 332.
108. See id. at 333.
109. SeeJaffe v. Accredited Sur. and Cas. Co., Inc., 294 F.3d 584 (4th Cir. 2002).
110. See id. at 593-94.
111. See id. at 594-95, 597.
112. See id. at 598.
*Catherine Pich6 is an associate at Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP in New York, NY.
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concerned is also a State Party, the 1970 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Evidence Convention) provides procedures
for judicial authorities of one signatory country to use in requesting evidence located in
another signatory country."'
Pursuant to subsection 1782(a)(2), a U.S. district court is authorized to order a person
who resides or is "found" in the district where the court sits to comply with letters rogatory
or requests made by a foreign or international tribunal, or by the application of any "in-
terested person," "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."'" 4 In 2002,
two federal circuits significantly expanded the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
B. SECOND CIRCUIT APPLIES PRINCIPLES OF TAG JURISDICTION TO DEPOSITION SUBPOENAS
In In re Application of Asher B. Edelman, the Second Circuit was asked to determine
whether an individual, who lives and works abroad, could be subpoenaed for deposition
pursuant to § 1782(a) while traveling in the United States."'
The ruling in Edelman originated from litigation in France involving Socidt6 du Louvre
(SDL), a French corporation, which had sued Asher Edelman and five investment funds
that he controlled. Edelman countersued, alleging that Taittinger, a member of SDL's board
of directors, mismanaged the company for his own benefit. SDL filed subpoena requests
in U.S. federal court for discovery and subsequently obtained documents from Edelman
and his companies. Edelman responded by filing subpoena requests of his own. When the
court granted the discovery requests, Taittinger was in France. Three days later, however,
while visiting New York, he was served with the subpoena for deposition testimony and
discovery of documents. After returning to France, Taittinger moved to quash the subpoena,
contending that he was not "found" in the court's jurisdiction, pursuant to § 1782(a). The
district court agreed. Taking a broad interpretation of § 1782, the Second Circuit revised,
holding that "a person who lives and works in a foreign country is not necessarily beyond
the reach of § 1782(a) simply because the district judge signed the discovery order at a time
when that prospective deponent was not physically present in the district." ''
The Second Circuit began its analysis by explaining that "[w]hat a person will testify to
is located wherever that person is found.""7 It then analyzed the language of § 1782, and
more precisely the meaning of "resides or is found [in the district in which the issuing court
sits].""' 8 The Second Circuit noted that § 1782(a) provides that discovery must be had in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that Federal Rules 45(c)(3)(A)(ii)
113. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23
U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention]. See also Socidt Nationale Indus-
trielle Atrospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2551, 482 U.S. 522, 538, 96 L.Ed.2d 461
(1987) (the Convention was intended to be a "permissive supplement," and not a "pre-emptive replacement"
for other means of obtaining evidence located abroad); Am. Home Ass. Co. v. Societ6 Comm. Toutdldctric,
104 Cal. App. 4th 406, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 430 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2002) (discovery procedures of the Hague
Evidence Convention are not required to be procedures of first resort for international discovery).
114. And, "to the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be
taken, and the document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2003). See Esses v. Hanania, 101 F.3d 873, 875 (2d Cir. 1996).
115. In re Edelman, 295 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2002).
116. Id. at 180.
117. Id. at 177.
118. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
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and 26(c), in particular, are sufficient to protect a nonresident prospective deponent from
burdensome travel."19
The court rejected the suggestion by Taittinger that the words "is found" meant that a
prospective deponent needed to be in the district at the precise time when the district court
issued the discovery order, reasoning that it saw no benefit in "requiring those involved in
this process to be compelled to jump through such procedural hoops." 20 The court ex-
plained that since the exercise of personal jurisdiction by U.S. courts based on nothing
more than physical presence-i.e., "tag jurisdiction"-was consistent with due process, the
discovery mechanism provided under § 1782(a) required no more, and that discovery could
be had from a witness who came traveling to the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).' 2
Looking at the legislative history of § 1782(a), the Second Circuit noted that the para-
graph had first been partly amended to .. . permit depositions in any judicial proceeding
without regard to whether the deponent is 'residing' in the district or only soourning there,"
and again amended to authorize other forms of discovery, in addition to depositions, to
describe the types of foreign proceedings for which discovery may be granted, and to de-
scribe who may petition for discovery. 2 The court concluded that "if a person is served
with a subpoena while physically present in the district of the court that issued the discovery
order, then for the purposes of § 1782(a), he is 'found' in that district."'23
Notwithstanding its holding that Taittinger was not beyond the scope of § 1782, the
Second Circuit agreed with Taittinger's claim that Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii) could bar
the deposition as he could not be compelled to travel more than 100 miles from his residence
to be deposed in the United States.12 4 As a consequence, the court remanded Taittinger's
claim to the trial court, and suggested that the district court consider the twin aims of the
statute, 25 as well as the "effect of its decision on the 'procedural parity' of the parties to
the French litigation," while deciding whether or not to quash the subpoena.26
C. NINTH CIRCUIT PERMITS DISCOVERY FOR USE IN EUROPEAN COMMISSION
ANTITRUST INVESTIGATIONS
In Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp.,i27 the Ninth Circuit concluded that Advanced
Micro Devices (AMD) could obtain domestic discovery from Intel Corp. (Intel), both
United States-based manufacturers of microprocessors, for use in antitrust investigations
by the Directorate General-Competition of the European Commission (Directorate
General).
The dispute in Intel Corp. arose in the context of an investigation of Intel Corporation
by the Directorate, initiated by a complaint by AMD. AMD alleged that its competitor
119. Id. at 178.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 179. See also Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fortress Re., Inc., No. M8-85, 1:02CV00054
(M.D.N.C.) 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14928 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2002).
122. Edelman, 295 F.3d at 179-80 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 180.
124. Id. at 181.
125. Esses, 101 F.3d at 876 ("providing... assistance to participants in international litigation in our federal
courts and encouraging foreign countries by example to provide similar means of assistance to our courts").
126. Edelman, 295 F.3d at 181.
127. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2002). Petition for Certiorari was
filed in Intel Corp. on October 11, 2002.
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Intel was abusing its dominant market position in Europe. To support its complaint, AMD
applied under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, to the district court in California for access to documents
and transcripts from a proceeding pending in federal court in Alabama. The district court
rejected AMD's request for discovery, on the basis that the matter before the Directorate
General was not "a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."12"
Reversing in an opinion by Judge Hawkins, the Ninth Circuit first summarized the
workings of the Directorate General and rejected Intel's assertions that the complaint
process before the Directorate General was purely administrative in nature and prelim-
inary to a non-judicial proceeding. 2 9 The court found, to the contrary, that the process
takes care to permit both the complainant and alleged infringer an ample opportunity
for input in the eventual recommendations and inserts an independent entity, the Eu-
ropean Commission Advisory Committee, between the Directorate's recommendation
that a formal complaint be issued and the Commission's decision to file a final enforceable
decision.so The court concluded that the Directorate's investigation leads "at a mini-
mum" to quasi-judicial proceedings and qualifies as a "proceeding before a tribunal"
within the broad interpretation of § 1782.'" It also impliedly found that AMD was an
"interested person" in the investigation, apparently on the basis that the action was ini-
tiated because of AMD's complaint."
2
The Ninth Circuit further addressed the issue of whether, prior to obtaining the discov-
ery under § 1782, it is necessary to demonstrate that the discovery sought in the U.S. court
would be available under the rules of the foreign proceeding itself. In the face of a circuit
split on that issue,' the Ninth Circuit sided with the Second and Third Circuits and held
that such a showing was not required, based on the fact that there is nothing in the plain
language or legislative history of § 1782 or its amendments that would require a threshold
showing that what is sought would be discoverable in the foreign proceeding.'
4
Finally, acknowledging that its decision allowed for "liberal discovery," the Ninth Circuit
emphasized that its view was consistent with the twin aims of § 1782 and reversed and
128. Id. at 666.
129. Id. at 667-68.
130. Id. at 668.
131. Id. at 667-68.
132. Id. at 665 n.l.
133. See, e.g., Four Pillars Enters Co., Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 308 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2002)
("This question, which has occasioned a divergence among the federal circuits, was recently resolved for this
circuit by [Intel Corp.] ... Itlhere we rejected any requirement of discoverability in the foreign tribunal."). The
First and Eleventh Circuits have imposed a discoverability requirement, based on a twofold rationale. First,
they sustain that there is a fear of offending foreign courts by using U.S. procedures to circumvent the foreign
country's own procedures and laws. Second, there is a concern that, without the discoverability requirement,
a U.S. litigant before a foreign court would be at a disadvantage relative to its foreign opponent, who could
freely seek broad discovery against its U.S. opponent pursuant to § 1782, while the U.S. party would be limited
to the discovery procedures of the foreign jurisdiction. See Application of Asta Medica S.A., 981 F.2d 1, 5-7
(1st Cir. 1992); Lo Ka Chum v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Request for Assistance
from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1154-55 (1 lth Cir. 1988), cert. denied
488 U.S. 1005 (1989).
134. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d at 669 ("Had Congress wished to impose such a [discoverability requirement on
parties, it could have easily done so."); see also In re Hughes, 281 B.R. 224, 229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("IS]ection
1782 does not limit discovery to that which would be permitted in the foreign state where the litigation is
taking place . . . section 1782(a) is consistent with section 304 [of the Bankruptcy Codel's policy of enabling
U.S. courts to assist foreign courts, particularly in matters involving discovery.").
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remanded the proceedings such that the district court could proceed to consider AMD's
request on the merits.
13 5
V. Developments in the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
KRISTEN BOON*
The doctrine of forum non conveniens grants courts the discretion to decline to exercise
jurisdiction over a controversy, even where jurisdiction and venue are proper. In PiperAir-
craft Co. v. Reyno, 136 the Supreme Court indicated that this power should be exercised where
the convenience of the parties and the court and the interests of justice indicate that the
action is more appropriately tried in another forum. Defendants bear the burden of proof
in an action to dismiss for forum non conveniens and must establish that a foreign forum is
adequate and available and that the public and private interest factors laid out in GulfOil
Corp. v. Gilbert," 7 weigh in favor of the alternate forum.
A. DEFERENCE TO PLAINTIFF'S CHOICE OF FORUM
In general, great deference is granted to a plaintiff's choice of forum.' Last year the
Second Circuit considered "what degree of deference... the district court [should] accord
to a United States plaintiff's choice of a United States forum where that forum is different
from the one in which the plaintiff resides."3 9 The court found that a plaintiff's choice of
any U.S. forum is to be respected where the decision to proceed in that forum is motivated
by recognized legal principles such as obtaining jurisdiction over defendants, witnesses and
evidence, rather than an improper motive such as forum shopping.'-'
In 2002, the Second Circuit elaborated that the level of deference accorded to a plaintiff
is undiminished by the fact that the U.S. plaintiffs are acting in a representative capacity as
part of a shareholder class action, where the majority of the plaintiff class have a bonafide
connection with the U.S. forum because they are residents.'
41
B. ADEQUACY OF THE ALTERNATIVE FORUM
Under Piper & GulfOil, a defendant must demonstrate that an adequate alternative forum
exists to successfully obtain a forum non conveniens dismissal. Whereas foreign courts with
different procedures, standards of due process, or levels of efficiency are generally consid-
ered to be adequate absent evidence of corruption or undue influence, 42 a recent decision
by the Southern District of New York suggests the adequacy of non-judicial fora will be
more closely examined. In In re: Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. Holocaust Insurance Litigation,1
41
135. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d at 669.
*Kristen Boon is a law clerk to Justice Ian Binnie, Supreme Court of Canada. This submission reflects the
personal views of the author and is not attributable to the Supreme Court of Canada.
136. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1980).
137. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
138. Id. at 508 ("unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed").
139. See Iragorri v. United Technologies Corp. & Otis Elevator Co., 274 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2001) (en
bane).
140. See id. at 75.
141. See DiRenzio v. Philip Servs. Corp., 294 F.3d 21, 28 (2d Cit. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 556 (2003).
142. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer Inc., 2002 Lexis 17436 at *23 (Sept. 17, 2002).
143. In re Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A Holocaust Ins. Litig., 228 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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the court dismissed defendants'forum non conveniens argument that the International Com-
mission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims, a private commission set up by European
insurance companies, governmental entities, and non-governmental organizations to re-
solve unpaid Holocaust-era insurance claims, was an adequate alternative forum. The dis-
trict court found that as an ad-hoc, non-judicial, private international claims tribunal created
and potentially controlled by defendants, the Commission was not entitled to the same
deference as the courts or an administrative arm of a foreign nation.
Efforts to base inadequacy on the quantum of remedy have, however, been strictly re-
jected. In Gonzalez v. Chysler Corp., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Mexico
was an adequate alternative forum despite a cap on damages which would entitle the plaintiff
to a de minimus recovery only. The Court rejected plaintiff's argument that the forum was
inadequate, even though the lawsuit would never be brought in Mexico because the costs
of litigating the case would exceed the potential recovery.144
C. THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND THE FORUM NON CONVENIENs DOCTRINE
In Hosaka v. United Airlines, 41 the Ninth Circuit considered whether the doctrine offorum
non conveniens survives the Warsaw Convention, which is silent on the availability of the
doctrine. Departing from the Fifth Circuit's holding in In re Air Crash Disaster Near New
Orleans Louisiana on July 9, 1982,146 the Ninth Circuit held that courts do not retain their
discretionary forum non conveniens power where the Convention applies, because: (1) the
purpose of the Convention is to achieve uniformity and to balance the interests of air
carriers against those of passengers; (2) the drafting history of the Convention suggests that
the forum non conveniens doctrine was not incorporated into Article 28; and (3) other inter-
national agreements which are silent on the doctrine do not permit its application.141
VI. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
ANDREW B. LOEWENSTEIN*
A. THE FSIA AND AGENCIES OR INSTRUMENTALITIES OF FOREIGN STATES
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),141 governs the amenability of foreign
sovereigns, including their "agencies or instrumentalities," to suit in the courts of the
United States. 149 Perhaps the most significant development in FSIA jurisprudence to occur
in 2002 was the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari in Patrickson v. Dole Food
Company" ° in order to consider two issues concerning the immunities of "agencies or in-
strumentalities" of foreign states."5 '
144. See Gonzalez v. Chrysler Corp., 301 F.3d. 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1928 (2003);
see also Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding New Zealand no-fault compensation
scheme adequate despite far lower damages as a remedy).
145. Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1284 (2003).
146. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, LA onjuly 9, 1982, 821 F.2d 1147, 1162 (5th Cir. 1987).
147. Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 15-30.
*Andrew B. Loewenstein is an associate at Foley Hoag LLP in Boston, Massachusetts.
148. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2003).
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2003).
150. Patrickson v. Dale Food Co., 251 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001), cen. granted in part 122 S. Ct. 2657 (June
28, 2002).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2003).
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Under the FSIA, agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states, such as state-owned
corporations, are accorded the same immunity as are bestowed upon foreign states them-
selves.I"2 Patrickson will resolve a circuit split over whether entities owned by agencies or
instrumentalities of foreign states (a structure known as "tiering") are themselves entitled
to immunity under the FSIA.'5 3 Patrickson will also determine whether a corporation is
entitled to immunity under the FSIA if a majority of its shares were owned by a foreign
state at the time of the events giving rise to litigation, but not at the time the plaintiff
commenced suit against the corporation.
B. EXCEPTIONS TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Under the FSIA, foreign sovereigns are presumptively immune from suit absent the
applicability of one of the statute's enumerated exceptions to immunity.5 4 In 2002, federal
courts considered cases involving the waiver, commercial activity, expropriation, immovable
property, tortious activity, and terrorism exceptions to sovereign immunity.
1. Waiver Exception
Under the FSIA's waiver exception, a foreign sovereign is not immune from suit in actions
"in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication."'55
In World Wide Minerals, Inc. Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan,15 6 the D.C. Circuit determined
the proper scope of a foreign sovereign's explicit waiver. The plaintiff, a foreign investor
in Kazakhstan's oil industry, executed four contracts with Kazakhstan. One contract un-
ambiguously waived Kazakhstan's sovereign immunity under the FSIA; a second contract
also waived sovereign immunity, but did not specifically reference the FSIA. 5 7 The re-
maining two contracts did not address waiver of immunity. 8 When the plaintiff sued al-
leging breach of all four contracts, the district court ruled that Kazakhstan's express waiver
of immunity gave it jurisdiction over all the claims, including the claims for breaches of the
contracts that did not have waiver clauses.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed, explaining that because the waivers in the first two
contracts did not suggest that they encompassed claims for breaches of the other two con-
tracts, the plaintiff could not maintain claims based on the latter two.5 9 The D.C. Circuit
found support for this holding in the Supreme Court's domestic sovereign immunity ju-
152. An agency or instrumentality is defined as "any entity" which "is a separate legal person, corporate
otherwise," which is "an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares
or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof," and which "is neither
a citizen of a State of the United States .. .nor created under the laws of any third country." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(a), (b).
153. Compare Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995) (subsidiaries of tiered, foreign state-
owned corporations are not entitled to immunity under the FSIA), witb In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn,
Indiana, 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996) (the FSIA grants immunity to subsidiaries of foreign state-owned
corporations).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
156. World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kaz., 296 F.3d 1154 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
157. Seeid. at 1162 n.13.
158. See id. at 1162.
159. See id. at 1163.
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risprudence, noting that "explicit waivers of sovereign immunity are narrowly construed 'in
favor of the sovereign' and are not enlarged 'beyond what the language requires. ' ''"
60
2. Commercial Activity Exception
The most frequently invoked exception to immunity under the FSIA is the commercial
activity exception.16' In First Merchants Collection Corp. v. Republic ofArgentina,62 the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida considered whether Argentina's confiscation of
merchandise was a "commercial activity" for purposes of the FSIA. The court held that
"seizure of goods by a nation's police force is not the type of action by which a private
party engages in trade, traffic or commerce," as the Supreme Court required for a com-
mercial activity in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover Inc.'6' Rather, "such an action is quin-
tessentially sovereign in nature." 16
First Merchants Collection also reaffirmed that the legality of a foreign sovereign's conduct
is not relevant for determining whether it is a commercial activity. The court explained that
"even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff's merchandise was unfairly, or even unlawfully,
confiscated by Argentine officials, such does not transform a clear exercise of sovereign
police power into a commercial activity.' ' 6 The Sixth Circuit came to the same conclusion
in Keller v. Central Bank of Nigeria.'66
Courts also interpreted the requirement under the first two clauses of the commercial
activity exception that the claim be "based upon" commercial activity in the United States.
In Lempert v. Republic of Kazakstan, 67 the plaintiff alleged a breach of contract claim based
on Kazakstan's alleged failure to pay for services rendered pursuant to a consulting contract.
The District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the plaintiff's contention that the
action was based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States because pre-
liminary negotiations between the parties and the solicitation of the plaintiff's services took
place in the United States.6s Noting that both the plaintiff's performance and Kazakhstan's
non-payment occurred in Kazakstan, the court held that the action was not "based upon"
a commercial activity carried on in the United States. 6 " Conversely, in BP Chemicals, Ltd.
v. ]iangsn Sopo Corp. (Group) Ltd., 7 ' the Eighth Circuit found that the plaintiff's claim for
misappropriation of trade secrets was based upon commercial activity carried on in the
United States. The court ruled that since the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had dis-
closed trade secrets to American vendors in the United States, its action was "based upon"
commercial activity in the United States. 7'
Under the third clause of the commercial activity exception, a foreign sovereign is
not immune from suit where the claim is based upon an act outside the United States in
160. Id. at 1162 (quoting Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986)).
161. 29 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
162. First Merchs. Collection Corp. v. Republic of Arg., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (S.D.Fla. 2002).
163. First Merchs., 190 F. Supp. 2d at 1338 (citing 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)).
164. Id. at 1338-39.
165. Id. at 1339.
166. Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 2002) ("any fraud or bribery involved did
not render the plan non-commercial").
167. Lempert v. Republic of Kaz., 223 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D.D.C. 2002).
168. Id. at 203.
169. Id.
170. BP Chems., Ltd. v. Jiangsu Sapo Corp. (Group) Ltd., 285 F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 2002).
171. Id. at 684.
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connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state that causes a direct effect in the
United States. The circuits are split over what qualifies as a "direct effect."'
72
In Virtual Countries, Inc. v. Republic of South Africa,173 the Second Circuit rejected the
suggestion that a foreign sovereign's issuance of a press release had a sufficient immediate
consequence in the United States for purposes of the direct effect test, because "the press
release's effect falls at the end of a long chain of causation and is mediated by numerous
actions by third parties."' 7 4 Likewise, in Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A.,' 17 the plaintiff
alleged that France Telecom monopolized the United States market for certain marketing
lists in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 7 6 The Second Circuit rejected the argument
that France Telecom fell within the FSIA's commercial activity exception on the ground
that France Telecom's alleged anti-competitive activity in France had a direct effect on
United States commerce. The plaintiff had not, the court found, "shown with even a mo-
dicum of detail any instances where American companies were deterred" from publishing
the plaintiff's marketing data by France Telecom's alleged anti-competitive activity
abroad.'7 7 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit acknowledged the possibility that a "somewhat
diminished showing of a 'direct effect' might be warranted in an antitrust action where the
plaintiff alleges that the complained of anti-competitive activity prevented entry into the
market as opposed to the impairment of competition already underway." 7 '
In Croesus EMTR Master Fund L.P v. Federative Republic of Brazil, the D.C. district court
ruled that:
non-payment could have had no 'immediate consequences'-and thus no 'direct effect'-in
the United States where there was never any designation of a place in the United States where
payment was to be received, much less any firm basis to believe that such a designation would
have been accepted by Brazil and proper as a matter of Brazilian law.'7'
Similarly, in Lempert v. Republic of Kazakstan,'5 ° the plaintiff, an American citizen who had
entered into a consulting contract with Kazakstan, argued that the Kazakstan's alleged refusal
to pay the plaintiff money owed under the contract caused a direct effect in the United States,
namely the plaintiff's alleged financial loss. The court ruled that "refusal to pay for services
performed by an American plaintiff usually does not meet the direct effect requirement,"
absent an assurance that payment would be made specifically in the United States.' 8'
172. In the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, a commercial activity outside the United States has a direct
effect in the United States only if the effect is "legally significant." See Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Arg., 941
F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991) aff'd 504 U.S. 607 (1992); Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 107 F.3d 720, 727 (9th
Cir. 1997); United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.3d 1232, 1239 (10th Cir. 1994).
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit, although not expressly adopting the legal significance test, holds that a plaintiff's
financial loss in the United States satisfies the direct effect test only if the foreign sovereign was obligated to
render payment in the United States. See Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank, 26 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (D.C.
Cir. 1994)); Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1514-15 (D.C. Cir. 1988). On the other hand,
the Fifth Circuit rejects the legal significance test, and holds that financial loss by an American plaintiff, if it is
an immediate consequence of the defendant's activity, is a direct effect in the United States. See Voest-Alpine
Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 897 (5th Cir. 1998).
173. Virtual Countries, Inc. v. Republic of S. Aft., 300 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2002).
174. Id. at 237.
175. Filetech S.A. v. Fr. Telecom S.A., 304 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2003).
177. Filetech, 304 F.3d at 182.
178. Id.
179. Croesus EMTR Master Fund L.P. v. Brazil, 212 F. Supp. 2d 30, 37 (D.D.C. 2002).
180. Lempert, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
181. Id.
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However, the Lempert opinion, following the concurrence in Goodman Holdings, suggested
that the direct effect test might be satisfied if there was a "longstanding consistent customary
practice" of sending payment to the United States.'82
Courts in other jurisdictions, however, adopted the Fifth Circuit's position that a com-
mercial activity need not cause a legally significant event in the United States in order to
qualify as a direct effect. The Sixth Circuit, in Keller v. Central Bank of Nigeria, ruled that
an effect need not be legally significant to be a direct effect in the United States since that
requirement is not found in the text of the FSIA and "the addition of unexpressed require-
ments to the statute is unnecessary." 8 ' Similarly, in Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. ErxonMobil
Corp., the District Court for the District of NewJersey ruled that "there is no requirement
of a 'legally significant act in the U.S. beyond a financial loss' to satisfy the direct effect
requirement.' 8 4 Consequently, Saudi Basic held that the financial loss of a United States
corporation, without more, "suffices for 'direct effect' such that the commercial activity
exception applies." '
3. Expropriation Exception
In Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 16 the Ninth Circuit addressed whether seizure of art
by the Nazis during World War II constituted the taking of property in violation of inter-
national law for purposes of the FSIA expropriation exception to sovereign immunity."7
The court reiterated the three-pronged standard for a taking to be valid under international
law: (1) the expropriation must "serve a public purpose"; (2) aliens cannot "be discriminated
against or singled out for regulation by the state"; and (3) an "otherwise valid taking is
illegal without the payment of just compensation."' 8 The Ninth Circuit found that the
allegations of the seizure of artwork, taken as true, established that the art had been "wrong-
fully and discriminatorily appropriated in violation of international law," since the seizure
had not been done for a public purpose but rather had been sold for personal gain.
89
4. Immovable Property Exception
The FSIA creates an exception to sovereign immunity for "any case in which.., rights
in immovable property situated in the United States are at issue."''9 In Fagot Rodriguez v.
Republic of Costa Rica, '9 the plaintiffs sued Costa Rican diplomats for, among other things,
182. Id. (quoting Goodman Holdings, 26 F.3d at 1147 (Wald, J., concurring)).
183. Keller, 277 F.3d at 818.
184. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Exxonmobil Corp., 194 F. Supp. 2d 378, 406 (D.NJ. 2002).
185. Id. at 407.
186. Altmann v. Republic of Aus., 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002).
187. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (specifically, ases
"in which rights inproperty taken in violation of international law re in issue and that property or
any property exchanged for such property is present in the United States in connection with a com-
mercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign states; or that property or any property
exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state
and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.").
188. Altman, 317 F.3d at 968 (quoting West, 807 F.2d at 831-32). The court also noted that "the plaintiff
cannot be a citizen of the defendant country at the time of the expropriation, because expropriation by a
sovereign state of the property of its own nationals does not implicate settled principles of international law."
Id. (internal citation omitted).
189. Id.
190. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4).
191. Rodriguez v. Republic of Costa Rica, 297 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 2002).
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non-payment of rent and trespass, and argued that the immovable property exception to
sovereign immunity gave the court jurisdiction over their claim. The First Circuit rejected
this argument. The court held that the immovable property exception to sovereign im-
munity "was not intended broadly to abrogate immunity for any action touching upon real
estate." 192 Therefore, a "simple contract dispute over nonpayment of rent" does not fall
within the exception to immunity. 93 The First Circuit thus set the rule that "the immovable
property exception applies only in cases in which rights of ownership, use, or possession
are at issue."194
5. Tortious Activity Exception
Under the FSIA's tortious activity exception to sovereign immunity, federal courts have
jurisdiction over claims in which "money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States
and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee
of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment."191 This
exception, however, does not apply to "any claim based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the
discretion be abused."'
96
In Fagot Rodriguez,'97 the plaintiffs sought damages for an alleged tortious trespass by
Costa Rican diplomats. The First Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiffs had
stated a claim for tortious trespass and that the diplomats acted within the scope of their
employment when the alleged trespass occurred. Nonetheless, the court ruled that the
plaintiffs could not establish jurisdiction under the tortious activity exception because the
trespass claims were based upon acts within the diplomat's discretion.
In determining that the diplomats' actions were discretionary, the First Circuit adopted
the Supreme Court's discretionary function test for construing claims under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).' 8 This test first requires that the court
determine whether the conduct in question "is a matter of choice for the acting em-
ployee.'" If a "statute, regulation or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an
employee to follow," then there is no room for choice and the discretionary function ex-
ception does not apply.200 Second, assuming that the challenged conduct "involves an ele-
ment of judgment," that judgment must be "of the kind that the discretionary function
exception was designed to shield," i.e.,- to "prevent judicial 'second guessing' of legislative
and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic and political policy through the
medium of an action in tort."20
192. Id. at 12 (quoting MacArthur Area Citizens Ass'n v. Republic of Peru, 809 F.2d 918, 921 (D.C. Cir.
1987)).
193. Id. at 12.
194. Id. at 13.
195. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
196. Id.
197. Rodiguez, 297 F.3d at 8.
198. Id. at 8-9; see also Maalouf v. Swiss Confederation, 208 F. Supp. 2d 31, 35 (D.D.C. 2002) (adopting
the Supreme Court's FTCA's discretionary function test for determining whether the tortious activity exception
to foreign sovereign immunity applies).
199. Rodriguez, 297 F.3d at 9.
200. Id. (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)).
201. Id. (quoting United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines, 467 U.S.
797, 814 (1984)).
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In applying the first prong of the discretionary function test the First Circuit noted that
it was uncontested that the diplomats had authority to establish a consulate and that this
necessarily involved an element of choice or judgment. The plaintiffs, however, argued that
the diplomats acted outside the scope of that authority by installing the consulate on prop-
erty allegedly in violation of the terms of a lease agreement and remaining on the property
without paying rent after the lease had been terminated. The First Circuit rejected this
argument, holding that a more specific directive than the diplomats' "general obligation to
avoid unlawful activity [was] required before we can conclude that the diplomats' conduct
was not the product of judgment or choice."20 2
Turning to the second prong of the test, the court observed that the "critical question"
for this inquiry is "whether the acts or omissions that form the basis of the suit are suscep-
tible to a policy-driven analysis," or, put differently, "whether some plausible policy justi-
fication could have undergirded the challenged conduct."2 °3 The court had little trouble
finding that the diplomats' decisions satisfied this standard, noting that the initial choices
as to whether, where, and how to set up the consulate, and their actions concerning the
early termination of the lease and demand for rent "clearly implicated policy issues."2°4
6. Terrorism Exception
In 1996, Congress amended the FSIA to add an exception to sovereign immunity for
actions "in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage
taking, or the provision of material support or resources ... for such an act."2 °0 For this
exception to apply, the foreign state must be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism
under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, and the claimant or victim
must be an American national when the act upon which the claim is based occurred.
In Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,206 the District Court for the District of Columbia
held that Section 1605(a)(7) does not merely provide an exception to foreign sovereign
immunity, but also creates a cause of action for victims of state-sponsored terrorism against
culpable foreign states.
C. OTHER FSIA-RELATED ISSUES
In several notable decisions, the courts addressed a number of other FSIA-related issues.
In Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya,2" 7 the D.C. Circuit held that "foreign
states are not 'persons' protected by the Fifth Amendment" and thus are not entitled to a
separate personal jurisdictional inquiry under constitutional due process standards. 0s In
Keller v. Central Bank of Nigeria,5 9 the Sixth Circuit ruled that foreign states are immune
from civil RICO claims. And in In re Republic of Philippines,2' 0 the Ninth Circuit held that
202. Id. at 10 (quotation omitted).
203. Id. at 11 (quoting Shansky v. United States, 164 F.3d 688, 692 (lst Cit. 1999)).
204. Id. (citing MacArthur Area Citizens Ass'n v. Republic of Peru, 809 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).
206. Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2002 VL 31830571 at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2002).
207. Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cit. 2002).
208. Id. at 96. The Supreme Court suggested in Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992)
that a foreign sovereign might not be a "person" under the Due Process Clause, but did not resolve the question.
209. Keller, 277 F.3d at 818-21.
210. In re Republic of Phil., 309 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2002).
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district courts are required to consider a foreign sovereign's claim to immunity before
addressing other issues.
VU. Developments in the Act of State Doctrine
CAROLINE LUCKENBACH*
The act of state doctrine precludes U.S. courts from reviewing a foreign sovereign's
public acts committed within its own territory.21' For a claim to be barred by the act of
state doctrine, a threshold determination of applicability must be made that the claim in-
volve (1) an official act of a foreign sovereign, (2) performed within its own territory, and
(3) relief sought that would require the court to declare the sovereign's act invalid.212 How-
ever, even where applicable, courts will not apply the doctrine unless, on balance, the doc-
trine's underlying policies-international comity, respect for the sovereignty of foreign
nations on their own territory, and the avoidance of embarrassment to the Executive Branch
in its conduct of foreign relations-justify its application. 213 Once invoked, the doctrine
serves as a rule of decision, which requires that "the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within
their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid."'2 4
In several developments this year, U.S. courts have further restricted the circumstances
in which the act of state doctrine will be found to bar courts from adjudicating claims
involving acts by a foreign sovereign.
A. WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY DO NOT CONSTITUTE OFFICIAL
SOVEREIGN ACTS
In 2002, war crimes and crimes against humanity were added to the growing list of acts
for which the act of state doctrine is no longer available to bar claims. In Sarei v. Rio Tinto
PLC,2 1 the District Court for the Central District of California held that the act of state
doctrine did not bar claims asserting war crimes and crimes against humanity based on the
conduct of the military of Papua New Guinea (PNG) during a civil war, although it did
bar environmental tort and racial discrimination claims. The plaintiffs, a class of PNG
*Caroline Luckenbach is an associate at Debevoise & Plimpton, New York, New York.
211. See World Wide Minerals, 296 F.3d at 1164 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
401, 84 S. Ct. 923, 926, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964)).
212. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2002). See also W.S. Kirkpatrick
& Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 406, 110 S. Ct. 701, 705, 107 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1990)(strictly
limiting application of the doctrine to cases in which deciding the case would require the court to declare
invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its boundaries); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Dated August 9, 2000, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding act of state doctrine inapplicable
because court would not be required to decide the validity of an official act of a foreign sovereign taken on its
own soil).
213. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428; W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 409; Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d
440, 452 (2d Cir. 2001).
214. World Wide Minerals, 296 F.3d at 1165 (internal quotes and cites omitted). Accord Sarei, 221 F. Supp.
2d at 1184 ("the doctrine is not one of abstention; rather, it is a 'principle of decision binding on federal and state
courts alike"') (quoting W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406, emphasis in original, internal quote omitted). But see
Sirico v. British Airways, No. 98-CV-4938, 2002 XVL 113877, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) ("the act of state
doctrine is an abstention doctrine") (citing Bigio, 239 F.3d at 451).
215. Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1184.
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residents, brought claims against Rio Tinto, PLC, an international mining group, based on
allegations that Rio Tinto's mining operations destroyed their island's environment,
harmed the health of its people and incited a ten-year civil war.
The court found that although orders given by military commanders during wartime are
typically viewed as official sovereign acts, where the commands do not involve legitimate
warfare, the acts in question are illegal acts committed during war, and the outcome is
different.2 6 Citing cases involving acts of international terrorism, torture, and genocide, all
of which have been held not to be valid acts of state, the court concluded the act of state
doctrine was not applicable to the claims of war crimes and crimes against humanity here
because a blockade and purported acts of torture, rape, and pillage could not be deemed
official acts of state.
21 7
B. COMMERCIAL EXCEPTION TO OFFICIAL ACTS LIMITED TO EXCLUDE ACTS PECULIAR
TO SOVEREIGN POWER
Although there is some question as to the existence of a commercial activity exception
to the act of state doctrine, two cases in 2002 at least recognized the possibility of such an
exception. The district court, in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, noted that cases have recognized a
commercial exception limited to "situations where governments are not exercising powers
peculiar to sovereigns. ' ' 2 1 The court concluded that the acts relevant to plaintiffs' environ-
mental tort and racial discrimination claims-PNG's grant of a concession to exploit natural
resources to Rio Tinto-constituted "public and governmental" and not "private and com-
mercial" actions because control over natural resources is a power peculiar to sovereigns.
With respect to the environmental tort and racial discrimination claims, the court found
that because the act of state doctrine was applicable and because two of the three policy
considerations supported its application, the claims were barred.
2 1 9
In the World Wide Minerals decision discussed in last year's article,220 the District Court
for the District of Columbia declined to consider claims against Kazakhstan that would
have required a determination of the validity of official acts of Kazakhstan. In 2002, the
D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of World Wide Mineral's claims, in part
through a straightforward application of the act of state doctrine."'2 1 At oral argument,
World Wide argued that the case should come within the commercial activity exception to
the act of state doctrine because the claims were based on purely commercial conduct by
Kazakhstan. Citing WS. Kirkpatrick222 and Alfred Dunhill of London v. Cuba,223 the Court of
Appeals acknowledged the existence of such an exception as an unsettled question, which
it had never before addressed. 224 Though because the commercial conduct cited by World
216. See id. at 1188-89.
217. Seeid. at 1189.
218. Id. at 1186 (quoting Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 408 (9th
Cir. 1983) (citing Alfred Dunhill)).
219. See id. at 1193. The district court did not consider what the Ninth Circuit subsequently articulated as
a "fourth factor"-whether the sovereign's actions were taken in the public interest (see infra)-which might
have affected the balance had the court considered it.
220. 116 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D.D.C. 2000).
221. 'World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
222. 493 U.S. 400, 404-05 (1990).
223. 425 U.S. 682, 695, 96 S. Ct. 1854, 1861-62, 48 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1976).
224. 296 F.3d at 1166, 1166 n.20.
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Wide was not the basis for the claims to which the act of state doctrine applied, it was
unnecessary for the court to reach the question of whether such an exception exists.2
C. FOURTH FACTOR ADDED TO BALANCING TEST
The Ninth Circuit has articulated a balancing test that further restricts the circumstances
under which the act of state doctrine should bar claims. In a consolidated action, John Doe
Iet al. v. Unocal Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that the act of state doctrine did not bar the
plaintiffs' claims against Unocal, an American oil company, despite finding that the doctrine
technically was applicable.z 6
Residents of Myanmar brought claims against the Myanmar Military (the new military
government that took control of Burma in 1988 and renamed it Myanmar); Myanmar Oil,
a state-owned company established to produce and sell the nation's oil and gas resources;
Total, a French oil company; and Unocal. The plaintiffs alleged that the Myanmar Military
subjected villagers of the Tenasserim region of Myanmar to forced labor, murder, rape, and
torture while constructing a gas pipeline through the region.227
The Ninth Circuit found the act of state doctrine applicable to the case because plaintiffs'
claims required the court to review official acts by the Myanmar Military within its own
territory.28 To determine whether to apply the doctrine, the court weighed the three policy
considerations first articulated in Sabbatino, plus a fourth factor added by the Ninth Circuit
in Liu v. Republic of China:2 9 whether the foreign state was acting in the public interest.2 30
The court found that apart from the respect to be accorded to Myanmar as a foreign
sovereign acting on its own territory all of the other factors weighed against application of
the act of state doctrine. Noting the international consensus against murder, torture, rape,
and slavery, the fact that the U.S. government already has denounced Myanmar's human
rights abuses and imposed sanctions, and that it would be difficult to contend that Myan-
mar's actions were taken in the public interest, the court held that the act of state doctrine
did not bar the plaintiffs' claims.'
In two decisions in 2002, courts in the Southern District of New York decided not to
apply the act of state doctrine as a bar where the underlying policy considerations did not
justify such application. In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the court declined to apply
the doctrine because the plaintiffs' claims would not interfere with Nigerian-American
relations where the accused military regime had been replaced by a democracy and the new
government had set up a commission to investigate the alleged abuses.232 In U.S. v. Portrait
of Wally, in addition to questions about whether either the "act" or "state" requirements
were met, the court found that the underlying policies weighed against application of the
doctrine because the case would not interfere with foreign relations where the action was
brought by the executive branch and restoration of proper ownership of seized property
was a pronounced goal of Austrian law.23'
225. Id. at 1166.
226. Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 WL 31063976, at *7-8 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002).
227. Id. at *20-21.
228. Id. at *20.
229. 892 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1989).
230. 2002 WL 31063976, at *20.
231. Id. at *21.
232. No. 96 Civ. 8386, 2002 XVL 319887, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
233. No. 99 Civ. 9940, 2002 WL 553532, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002). See also Sirico, 2002 WL 113877,
at *2 (declining to apply the act of state doctrine where nothing in the case would impact upon foreign relations).
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VIII. Extraterritorial Application of United States Law
VINCENT CHIRICO*
In 2002, courts dealt with the question of the extraterritorial application of U.S. law in
various spheres, including bankruptcy, securities transactions, antitrust, immigration, the
internet, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
A. BANKRUPTCY
In Stonington Partners v. Lernout & Hauspie,114 Lernout & Hauspie (L&H), a Belgian
corporation, purchased a dictation technology company from Stonington, a United States
corporation, in a stock transaction. On November 27, 2000, Stonington sued L&H in the
Delaware Chancery Court alleging that the acquisition was procured by fraud. The next
day, Stonington obtained a Belgian court order directing L&H to turn over its shares of
the acquired company to a Court-appointed trustee. On November 29, 2000, L&H filed a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware. The very next day, L&H also filed for bankruptcy protection in Belgium. The
proceedings ensued simultaneously. In May 2001, the district court granted L&H's request
for a declaratory judgment that any claim asserted by Stonington in the.Delaware Chancery
Court would be subject to mandatory subordination under section 510(b) of the United
States Bankruptcy Code. In Belgium, however, Stonington asserted its right to pursue treat-
ment of its unsecured claims on parity with other unsecured creditors, so that they would
not be subject to subordination, and the Belgian court rejected L&H's application to con-
firm the district court's reorganization plan, which would have subordinated Stonington's
claims. L&H subsequently filed an amended adversary proceeding complaint in Delaware
and sought a declaratory judgment that the claims should be determined exclusively by the
Delaware Court in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code. The Delaware Court granted
declaratory and injunctive relief, directing Stonington not to pursue its argument in Bel-
gium. The order was affirmed by the district court.
The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the applicable case law unequivocally directed
U.S. courts to exercise restraint in enjoining foreign proceedings. Noting its skepticism
that an anti-suit injunction could be found appropriate under these circumstances, the
appellate court nonetheless remanded the action to the Bankruptcy Court to determine
whether an anti-suit injunction was appropriate in light of various comity concerns that
were not previously considered. In so doing, the Third Circuit reiterated the well-
established notion that enjoining a party from resorting to a foreign court is equivalent to
enjoining foreign proceedings. 3 5
B. SECURITIEs LITIGATION
In United International Holdings, Inc. v. The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd.,236 the defendant was a
cable company that obtained a license to operate a cable service in Hong Kong. The plaintiff
Vincent Chirico is a senior associate at Harris Beach, LLP, specializing in the trial and appeal of complex
litigation matters in the mass tort, toxic tort, products liability, and commercial litigation fields.
234. 310 F.3d 118 (3rd Cir. 2002).
235. CitingCompagnie des Bauxites de Guina v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981).
236. 210 F.3d 1207 (2000).
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was a cable systems investor that negotiated with the defendant to provide various resources
in exchange for a right to invest in the cable service. The terms of this agreement were
never reduced to writing. After the defendant was awarded the license, it failed to honor
its commitment to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued and won compensatory and punitive
damages; the defendant appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment, holding that the anti-fraud provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act 3' "prohibit fraud in the sale of securities when significant conduct
occurs in the United States or conduct occurs anywhere and has substantial effects on
investors in the United States."23 The Court noted that the crux of plaintiff's lOb-5 claim
was a meeting between the plaintiff and the defendant in Colorado, where the negotiations
and sale of the security took place, and the most material of the defendant's misrepresen-
tations were made at that meeting. The Court also noted that the defendant had not dem-
onstrated a compelling reason to justify a reversal based on comity grounds because a true
conflict between United States and Hong Kong law did not exist since compliance with the
judgment did not require the defendant to violate Hong Kong law.
C. ANTITRUST
In Kruman v. Christie's International,23 9 plaintiffs brought an action pursuant to the Clay-
ton' 4° and Sherman' 4' Acts, alleging that defendant auction houses entered into an agree-
ment to fix the prices they charged their clients for their services as auctioneers performing
auctions outside the United States. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed the action on the ground that the conduct alleged was not
subject to the antitrust laws pursuant to the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982 (FTAIA).' 4' Although the Second Circuit agreed that the FTAIA applied to the de-
fendants' alleged conduct, it vacated the portion of the District Court's judgment granting
the defendants' motion to dismiss. The Second Circuit found that the Sherman Act applied
to the conduct in question because it had the "requisite effects" of injury to domestic
commerce, which was regulated by the Sherman Act. The court noted that while the anti-
trust laws do not extend to conduct that exclusively affects foreign markets, anticompetitive
conduct directed at foreign markets can also directly affect the competitiveness of domestic
markets.
D. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
In Torrico v. International Business Machines Corporation,43 the plaintiff was a citizen of
Chile employed in New York by IBM. The plaintiff's responsibilities included frequent
travel to various countries throughout Latin America, including Chile. In June 1995, the
plaintiff and IBM agreed to a three-year temporary rotational assignment to IBM's facilities
237. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
238. Id. at 1223.
239. 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
240. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 16.
241. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3.
242. Kruman v. Christie's Int'l, 129 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6a).
243. 213 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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in Chile in order to help the plaintiff perform his duties more effectively. During the
assignment, the plaintiff became ill and required a temporary leave of absence, during which
he remained in Chile. Due to a subsequent reorganization, IBM advised the plaintiff that
it would not retain his position and that he should endeavor to obtain another available
position with the company by January 31, 2000. Upon learning that a position was expected
to open in March 2000 and because his physical condition would not enable him to secure
a position prior to that date the plaintiff requested an extension of his termination date.
IBM rejected the plaintiff's request and terminated him effective January 31, 2000. The
plaintiff sued alleging violations of inter alia the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)244
and the New York Human Rights Law.2
4
IBM moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for judgment
on the pleadings, arguing that the plaintiff was not within the class of individuals protected
by the statute because he was a non-U.S. citizen who was working in Chile at the time of
his termination. The court denied the motion, holding that the facts as alleged in the
complaint and in opposition to the motion might support a conclusion that he was "em-
ployed in the United States," and thus covered by the protections of the ADA. The Court
also held that the extraterritorial provision of the New York Human Rights Law2" did not
interfere with the federal government's conduct of foreign relations1 41
E. IMMIGRATION
In United States ofAmerica v. De Leon,248 the defendant, who had previously been deported
to the Dominican Republic after satisfying a prison sentence following a drug dealing con-
viction, was accused of seeking to make a surreptitious entry into the United States on a
vessel found off the coast of Puerto Rico. After his conviction, the defendant appealed,
claiming that 8 U.S.C. § 13 26, which makes it a crime for an alien who has previously been
deported to enter unless certain conditions are met, did not apply to conduct that occurred
wholly outside the United States. The defendant's argument was based on the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,249 and claimed that the United States, by
ratifying the Convention, impliedly agreed that it would not apply its laws to conduct
occurring beyond the Zone (twelve miles from the shore).
The Court of Appeals rejected defendant's argument, noting that the Convention did
not "bar the application of federal statutes to conduct, whether within or beyond the con-
tiguous zone, that has a substantial adverse effect within the United States," and that various
statutes explicitly permitted such conduct.250
F. THE INTERNET
Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd.25' involved an April Fool's joke by Harrods, the well-
known London department store. On March 31, 2002, Harrods issued a press release, and
244. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
245. N.Y. Exec. Law § 290.
246. N.Y. Exec. Law § 298-a(1).
247. 213 F. Supp. 2d at 410.
248. 270 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2001).
249. 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1612 (1958).
250. 270 F.3d at 94 (citing the Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. § 954 (1994), and the Foreign Trade Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994)).
25 1. No. 02 Civ. 3979, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19516 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2002).
SUMMER 2003
510 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
subsequently posted a web announcement indicating that Harrods planned to "float" Har-
rods by building a ship version of the store to be moored in London on the Thames River.
Individuals seeking further comment were directed to contact "Loof Lirpa" ("April Fool"
spelled backward). Dow Jones read the release as purporting to announce that Harrods
planned to issue a public offering of its stock, and published an article to that effect in both
its print version (Wall Street Journal) and on its website. Upon learning that the offer was
a joke, Dow Jones published a correction in print and on the web. On April 5, 2002, Dow
Jones issued its own story, apparently intended as its light-hearted response, entitled "The
Enron of Britain?" Harrods subsequently advised Dow Jones that its article "caused serious
damage" to Harrods' reputation worldwide by linking Harrods with Enron, and demanded
an apology. DowJones denied that its article was defamatory and offered to print an opinion
piece provided by Harrods. Harrods refused and commenced a defamation action in the
High Court of Justice in London.
Dow Jones subsequently commenced an action in the Southern District of New York,
seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief precluding Harrods from pursuing its
claims in London. Dow Jones argued, inter alia, that its April 5 article represented only
protected expressions of opinion under the First Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution that defending the London action would cause Dow Jones to incur significant costs,
and that permitting the London action would subject Dow Jones to related litigation
throughout the world due to the publishing of its web version of the April 5 article.
The district court granted Harrods' motion to dismiss, holding in part that it was doubtful
that any injunctive ruling would gain recognition in a foreign tribunal, that comity war-
ranted the dispute to be resolved by the London court, and that the New York action
amounted to strategic forum shopping motivated by pursuit of a tactical edge over an
opponent. In response to Dow Jones's claim of the existence of a true conflict between
United States and British courts on the defamation issue, the district court noted that Dow
Jones's argument was at best premature since no actual controversy existed, particularly
because the London court had not yet ruled on the dispute before it. In support of its
holding, the district court reiterated the general rule that "except in very narrow, compelling
circumstances such as to prevent 'an irreparable miscarriage of justice,' there is no justifiable
basis for issuing a restraining order for this purpose, especially where the restraint affects
the forum where an alleged injury occurred and whose laws are being invoked."' 2
252. Id. at *108.
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